An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements

Speaker: Zaifu Yang

Affiliation: The University of York, UK

Time: Tuesday 18/12/2012 from 14:00 to 15:00

Venue: Access Grid UWS. Presented from Penrith (Y239), accessible from Parramatta (EB.1.32) and Campbelltown (26.1.50).

Abstract: This talk will introduces an efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for selling several complementary goods to finitely many bidders. The goods are traded in discrete quantities. The seller has a reserve price for every bundle of goods and determines which bundles to sell based on current prices. The auctioneer announces a current price for every bundle of goods and a supply set of goods, every bidder subsequently responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and then the auctioneer adjusts prices. We prove that even when bidders can exercise their market power strategically, this dynamic auction always induces them to bid truthfully as price-takers, resulting in an efficient allocation, its supporting Walrasian equilibrium price for every bundle of goods, and a generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment for every bidder.

Biography: Professor Zaifu Yang holds a chair in economics at the University of York. He has widely published in leading academic journals such as Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Mathematics of Operations Research, Mathematical Programming, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization etc.